Jim Webb knows the military - particularly the Navy - as well as anyone does. Webb sits on the Senate Armed Services Committee and is a respected voice on these matters. That's why I find
Webb's statement about Defense Secretary Gates' "highly unorthodox" (to use Webb's words) proposed Defense budget to be so interesting. Personally, I believe that Gates is doing an excellent job and has put a great deal of thought into where the Defense Department needs to go. I also believe that it's long past time we reevaluate our military needs and capacities in light of the threats we face today - and are likely to face in years to come. Obviously, that no longer means a military force structure focused on defeating a Soviet invasion of Europe, but what DOES it mean exactly? I'm glad to hear that Jim Webb will be one of the people looking at this question carefully and coming up with a plan that most effectively (that includes cost-effectively) secures our nation and its vital interests. In short, I look forward to the day when - to paraphrase Don Rumsfeld - we go to war with the army we WISH to have, not the one we're stuck with or that we might have at a later time.
Secretary of Defense Gates today proposed a lengthy list of programmatic and manpower decisions as part of his intention to reshape the U.S. defense establishment. These recommendations should—and will—be evaluated in terms of their potential impact on our long-term strategic requirements.
The secretary’s announcement today is highly unorthodox. Such a major shift toward a ‘different strategic direction’ early in a new administration normally flows from such strategy-driven assessments as the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) or the formulation of a new U.S. national security strategy. Of particular note is his contemplation of maintaining long-term increases in Army and Marine Corps end strength, based on current operational requirements in Iraq and Afghanistan, in the absence of a comprehensive strategy.
Similar concerns arise regarding our global basing posture, which I strongly believe should be examined based on need and cost-effectiveness, in the same manner that domestic facilities are considered in the Base Closure and Realignment (BRAC) process.
Secretary Gates has proposed funding increases, reductions, deferrals, and cancellations in numerous defense programs. In the absence of a more detailed description of the strategic underpinnings justifying his funding priorities—including an assessment of the level of risk posed to U.S. national security interests—it is difficult to evaluate them in isolation.
For example, the secretary has called for major adjustments to the U.S. Navy’s force structure—including a reduction in the long term to the statutory requirement for the Navy to maintain a force of 11 operational aircraft carriers. Other proposed changes to the Navy’s current shipbuilding plan for a 313-ship fleet could generate new instabilities.
I have a very strong view—one developed over many years—that we must grow the Navy’s force structure in order for us to meet our strategic and security interests around the world now and those we are likely to face in the future. This is especially relevant in the Pacific region, where China is pursuing a rapid, comprehensive modernization of its armed forces, including its Navy. Secretary Gates recently reported to Congress this modernization program entails military roles and missions that go well beyond China’s immediate territorial interests.
In other respects, I commend the secretary’s call for necessary reforms in the way that the Department of Defense conducts its business, including an end to defense supplemental appropriations to fund the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. I have consistently maintained that funding for such requirements should be included in the base defense budget. I welcome a return to a more disciplined defense budget process.
I also welcome his advocacy of a fundamental overhaul of defense procurement, acquisition, and contracting. I have warned for more than three years that the Department of Defense has relied too heavily on civilian contractors, especially for wartime support. The secretary’s plan for increasing the size of the defense acquisition workforce and converting 11,000 contractors are needed steps in the right direction.
We in Congress must consider the secretary’s proposal carefully in our oversight role. We will do so in the months ahead after the defense budget is formally delivered to Congress.
