Despite Republicans' (and possibly the media's) almost certain desire to oversimplify the disastrous Virginia election results last night and try to blame it all on "Barack Obama, Harry Reid and Nancy Pelosi," the facts - exit polls, history (e.g., Virginia's 30-year record of electing governor's of the opposite party from whoever is in the White House), economic worries, one great gubernatorial campaign (McDonnell's) and one horrible one (Deeds'), running a rural candidate vs. a suburban candidate in an urban/suburban/exurban state, etc. - tell a completely different story. The following is a lengthy analysis, which I've pulled together after consulting with more than a dozen Virginia Democrats I respect greatly - elected officials, committee chairs, campaign managers, Democratic and progressive activists - of the key factors behind what happened yesterday. Thanks to everyone who contributed, who strengthened the post tremendously, and who helped turn it into a de facto "after action review" of the Deeds campaign.1. The "Enthusiasm Gap" - National, Quasi-Cyclical Factors
From 2005 through 2008, Virginia Democrats were able to run with a strong tailwind at their backs, while Virginia Republicans had a gale-force wind (we'll call it "Hurricane George" for George W. Bush) in their faces. Democrats were angry - at Iraq, at Hurricane Katrina, at budget deficits caused by huge giveaways to rich people and corporations, at Republican scandals and corruption, etc. - and anger is a potent form of energy when it comes to getting people energized for political engagement. Ultimately, all of this contributed to Virginia Democrats winning both U.S. Senate seats, 6 of 11 seats in our U.S. House of Representatives delegation, (narrow) control of the state Senate, gains in the House of Delegates, and the governor's mansion.
This year, the situation was reversed to a large extent, with Republicans in Virginia (and across the nation) energized - witness the "TEA Party" phenomenon - and Democrats relatively complacent after all those victories the past few years. In addition, many (most?) Democrats are currently focused on the bad economy (I agree with Joe Trippi that this will hurt all incumbents, Democratic and Republican alike), anxiety over their jobs (or their quest for employment), tending to their families, and generally living their lives. Politically, a lot of Democrats are focused on the battle over health care, which has sucked up much of their time and energy politically the past few months. To some extent, this is all cyclical - for Democrats, an incredible high followed by a letdown; for Republicans, years of getting their butts kicked finally causing them to get out and vote.
In contrast, Republicans right now are energized, albeit (I'd argue) for the wrong reasons - misguided opposition to the concept of "national health care," similarly misguided opposition to "cap and trade," sudden/hypocritical horror at budget deficits after ignoring them the past 8 years (and not giving Bill Clinton credit for getting the country back in the black financially), blaming Democrats for a deep recession that began under the Bush Administration, hysteria over "socialism" and whatever Glenn and Rush have worked them up into a lather about today, etc. However, just because Republicans are totally off base in my opinion (and in the opinion of most Democrats) doesn't change the fact that they're energized; just as Republicans claim that Democrats were motivated by "Bush Derangement Syndrome" or whatever from 2005 to 2008. In the end, energy is energy, and the Republicans had the edge this year. Also, it's important to point out that large chunk of "less engaged" voters (i.e. not the angry or motivated voters described above) tend to place blame and negative feelings on the incumbent party regardless of details. It's not fair, but it's life.
The result of all this: a huge "enthusiasm gap," with much higher turnout by Republicans than Democrats yesterday - particularly when you compare it to the mood last November, when Barack Obama pulled in 1.96 million votes. In analyzing Bob McDonnell's victory last night, this "enthusiasm gap - national" certainly played a role. Having said that, let's not overestimate it; the fact is, it doesn't come close to fully explaining Bob McDonnell's huge margin of victory. For that, we need more to look at a few more factors, including - especially - the Deeds campaign itself!
2. Enthusiasm Gap - Factors Specific to This Campaign
What's amazing is how good Virginia Democrats were feeling just 5 months ago. True, the three-way gubernatorial primary (Creigh Deeds, Brian Moran, Terry McAuliffe) was bruising, but Creigh Deeds' victory on June 9 was overwhelming (50%-26%-24%) and appeared to leave a united Democratic Party in its wake. In addition, Creigh Deeds got a nice post-primary "bounce," with two polls showing him jumping into the lead against Bob McDonnell by a 4-6 point margin. Not too shabby. Yet somehow, this all fell apart, with the horrendous results we saw last night. Did the "national climate" change that much in a few months? I don't think so. Instead, we need to look at the campaigns themselves, and on that score, Bob McDonnell's campaign far outperformed Creigh Deeds' on just about every metric - money, messaging, media, you name it. We could talk for hours about all the mistakes the Deeds' campaign made, and I'm sure we will, but here are a few big ones.
2a. Deeds Campaign Strategy, or Lack Thereof
First, the overall strategy was unclear/incoherent and ultimately self-defeating, with extremely poor "framing" of what this election was all about. For instance, the was this a "change" ("throw the bums out!") or "continuity" (e.g., "let's keep a good thing going!") election? To the extent an answer to that question was made clear, it was overwhelmingly "continuity," with Deeds unsuccessfully (and absurdly) attempting to run as "Mark Warner Part III" (sorry, but there are WAYYYYY too many degrees of separation between Warner and Deeds for that to have been effective) and "Tim Kaine Part II" (does anyone have a clue what that even means? regardless, Deeds wasn't Kaine's LG or anything like that, and Kaine wasn't super popular like Warner was in 2005...), at a time when anxious and even angry voters were clearly looking to shake things up. The fact is, this campaign needed to be a hybrid of "change" and "continuity," something along the lines of "Warner and Kaine did well, but there's tons more work to do (and, by the way, we need to get rid of the flat-earth Republicans who have opposed Warner and Kaine at nearly every turn).
Also left unclear was the kind of Democrat Creigh Deeds was -- a "Barack Obama Democrat" or a (poorly-defined/hazy) "Creigh Deeds Democrat." Instead, Deeds seemed to go back and forth, occasionally embracing Obama but mostly running away from his agenda (climate change/clean energy, health care reform, deficit spending to "stimulate" the economy, etc.). This was disastrous; leaving Creigh with an identity crisis that led to absurd outcomes like conservatives thinking he's "too liberal" and liberals thinking he's "too conservative." Ugh.
The fact is, winning this election always was going to come down to recreating, to the extent possible, the Obama coalition of 2008. Instead, Deeds' decision to run away from Obama (until his "too little too late" embrace of Obama at the end) ultimately meant that Obama Democrats saw no reason to get excited about this election. In short, there was a clear disconnect between the top of the statewide ticket this time around and the first-time/"presidential only" voters who were excited by the historic nature of Obama's campaign last year. Hence, the huge dropoff in Democratic voters relative to Republican voters from 2008.
And no, as much as Republicans want to make it into the story, Barack Obama himself was not a significant factor in Bob McDonnell's victory last night. There's no need to believe me, though; look at the polling evidence: Obama's approval rating in Virginia is around 50% (or higher), and only 15% of Virginia voters say opposition to Obama is a factor in their vote, with 14% saying that support for him is a factor. Also see the exit poll results, which corroborate the pre-election polling. In short, as much as Republicans want to try and make Obama an "issue" in this election, he wasn't. Period.
In terms of state issues, Deeds also was never clear about some of the big ones, with the post-debate "scrum" fiasco where Deeds couldn't clearly answer if he'd raise taxes to pay for transportation epitomizing the entire campaign (and also where he had top campaign staffers right there, but nobody "saved" him or tried to pull him out of there). Bob McDonnell may have been (badly) wrong on every single issue, but at least he appeared to be (semi) coherent. Deeds may have been right on most issues, but he was almost totally incoherent and non-specific (has anyone seen a Deeds transportation plan beyond "ve form committee, da"/"get a big table and put everything on it?").
Why didn't Deeds have a "business plan for Virginia," like Terry McAuliffe did? Why didn't Deeds push high-speed rail and broadband deployment, more issues which cut across regional lines? Why was this campaign run on the Republican "framing" of "taxes are bad," "strong environmental action is bad," etc? How could Deeds have been unprepared for obvious questions on taxes, health care, etc? Why didn't Creigh leverage the federal unemployment stimulus money issue into a broad attack against McDonnell as not caring about "people like you and me" (this narrative cuts through the urban/rural divide, btw, and squares with Creigh's narrative of coming from an economically disadvantaged area but bringing hope and opportunity to all corners of Virginia)? Instead, the Deeds campaign abandoned this for "all thesis, all the time" - and it killed us (including, as one contributor to this pointed out, " in the rural areas because it totally fits with the arrogant judgmental suburbanite Democrat stereotype."). None of this makes any sense, beyond gross incompetence.
Other than that, the campaign made a huge mistake in never laying down a strong personal and political narrative FOR Creigh Deeds (as opposed to AGAINST Bob McDonnell). Without such a narrative, as both Tim Kaine (deeply religious man, Catholic missionary in Honduras, but an attorney who will uphold the laws of Virginia) and Jim Webb (true American hero based on his service to our country, family roots going back generations in Southwester Virginia, an early and outspoken opponent of the Iraq war, social libertarian, and economic populist) had going for them in their respective races, you're pretty much lost. Also, without that positive narrative, you can't effectively either a) go negative yourself; or b) defends yourself adequately against negative attacks on you (e.g., the Kilgore "Hitler" ads backfired because they were crazy, but also because people felt that they knew where Kaine was coming from and liked him; the "pedophile" charges against Webb similarly backfired). [Note: I was told by a contributor to this report that Joe Abbey actually said in early September that he "believes 100% in a negative campaign" and that "even if we lose, I'd be content if we at least let people know who Bob McDonnell is."]
Thus, going relentlessly after "the thesis" might have worked in a different year, when people weren't focused almost 100% on jobs and the economy, but it sure as hell wasn't going to work this year. Why on earth the Deeds campaign wasn't run almost exclusively on economic issues, with a "Bob McDonnell=Pat Robertson" thrown in for good measure, is utterly beyond me. Also, it boggles my mind that Deeds never clearly framed the issues in this campaign or defined himself personally and politically. Instead, Deeds spent the summer raising money, putting his campaign together, and allowing Bob McDonnell to (falsely but effectively) define himself as a suburban, moderate soccer dad with an attractive family. Deeds, meanwhile, stayed almost completely undefined in the eyes of most voters, except as some fuzzy figure from a part of Virginia that most people have never been to...
Finally, whoever made the decision to spend inordinate amounts of time in "Deeds Country" as opposed to the "urban crescent" (Hampton Roads/Richmond/NOVA) was - not to put a fine point on this one - a complete imbecile who should never work in Virginia politics again. (Actually, one contributor to this report - a committee chair - told me point blank that Deeds simply "doesn't understand the urban crescent," and that either McAuliffe or Moran would have been far better choices). This is as "no-brainer" as you can get; go where the votes are, and also where you need to reach out. In Mark Warner's case, he was a rich guy from Alexandria so he went to SWVA, sponsored a NASCAR team, immersed himself in rural culture, even had a bluegrass song written for him ("Mark Warner, Public Education"). In Creigh Deeds' case, the obvious thing to do was to spend 90% of his time reaching out to urban, suburban and exurban voters - blacks (I can't emphasize this one enough) and other "minority groups," liberal/moderate suburban whites, young people - in the "crescent."
In other words, Deeds needed to mobilize the Obama coalition, but he didn't do it. You know when I concluded that Deeds would lose for sure? When I read this Washington Post article, in which Creigh was asked by a reporter why he kept coming back to small towns in rural Virginia, where they already knew him, and he responded, "Because these are my home people." Right there, I knew that Deeds was staying in his comfort zone, and also that he didn't "get it" with regard to his need - as someone from a rural part of the state - to reach out the other direction, to the "urban crescent." Let me be clear: this is all about political strategery, no commentary whatsoever on which part of Virginia is "better." It's simple, though: go where the voters are, and also compensate for your weaknesses by reaching out to the people who don't know you and/or don't naturally relate to you (as Warner did in 2001). This is a complete no brainer, yet the Deeds campaign didn't do it. Utterly inexcusable.
2b. Deeds Campaign Execution, or Lack Thereof
First mistake: Creigh basically went silent for two months from primary day to August 1 in order "to raise money," while McDonnell ran around building up his positive message (because he had the money to do so). Sorry, but you simply can't go silent when your opponent is messaging; that allowed Bob to construct his "good guy" narrative. Bob was taking hits during the primary because the DGA was hammering him. That's why it got close in the polls then, but after the primary...nada.
How could the Deeds campaign possibly have been unprepared for the inevitable attack on him as a tax raiser? You'd think that would be impossible, given the 100% certainty the Republicans would use it, yet in the end, the Deeds campaign was not prepared to defend itself, to make the obvious argument that roads (and everything else people want) cost money, and said money doesn't grow on trees. Instead, Creigh was evasive on the question of tax increases. This was a double debacle, both eroding Creigh's image as "not smooth, but will tell it to you straight" and also making him look weak. I can't tell if this was incompetence on the part of the campaign, or if it was an actual strategy to use code words ("anything with a nexus to transportation" - hmmmm, what could THAT be?!? lol) and see how long it would take before some reporter forced him to utter those horrible words "gas tax increase." Either way, it was extremely poor strategy, executed poorly. And they pay these consultants how much money to come up with this crap?
Speaking of consultants, I've heard a lot of names bandied about as being responsible for Deeds' horrible campaign. A couple of points on this. First, as Jim Webb likes to say, "the fish rots from the head down." In other words, it's all ultimately the candidate's fault - he hires all those people, pays their salaries, etc. Having said that, there's plenty of blame to go around, from terrible strategy to inconsistent/incoherent media to a badly run political shop (how many elected Democrats and committee chairs have complained that they never had their calls returned and/or were not listened to?), an almost complete lack of specific policy papers (note: one Democratic activist told me he thinks "this was the central failure of the Deeds campaign," that "the polls would be a lot closer had Deeds actually COME UP WITH SOME FREAKIN' IDEAS before it was too late"), minimal opposition research (the "thesis" came about because McDonnell told Washington Post reporter Amy Gardner about it, not because the Deeds campaign's crack researchers went to Regent and uncovered it themselves), mediocre fundraising (in the general election, as of late October, Deeds had raised $10 million compared to $21 million for McDonnell; by way of comparison, Terry McAuliffe raised $8.3 million in the primary alone!), you name it.
The names I've heard thrown around most frequently as "to blame" (aside from Creigh himself) include Susan Swecker (I've never met her, but I haven't heard one good thing about her from the dozen or so people who've contributed to this report, with the typical comment being "she's horrible"), Monica and David Dixon, Kevin Mack (one committee chair said he "screws up mail pieces every year"), David Petts, Joe Abbey (who I've also heard has been a "figurehead" for many months now; I've also been told that he "bad mouthed/blew off anyone who disagreed with him," that it was "his way or the highway," that he was "extremely arrogant after winning the primary") and Levar Stoney (I was told that he doesn't communicate, is "arrogant," and "blows people off") at the Deeds campaign; Kevin O'Holleran, the head of the "coordinated" (using the term VERY loosely) campaign; Matt Mansell of the House Democratic caucus; the Senate caucus under Steve Pazmino ("haven't heard anything from them all year," one committee chair angrily told me); and Dickie Cranwell at the "non-existent DPVA" (a phrase used by another Democratic Party insider who provided inputs to this analysis).
One last bit of commentary on the disaster that was the Deeds campaign, from a great Virginia Democrat who knows the situation very well.
The one thing that jumped out at me is the Deeds campaign's unwillingness to admit (by action or otherwise) that they were on the wrong track. Even when poll after poll came out saying they were down double digits they continued the "Thesis barrage" and did it arrogantly in the faces of concerned Dems. The pure fact that they were so oblivious to the reality says either they were too stupid to know otherwise or too arrogant to listen. Either way anyone associated with the leadership of that campaign should never work in VA politics again. I kept waiting on something in the last 2-3 weeks that would act as at least an attempt to change the game in some way and it never came.
2c. Deeds, The Flawed Candidate
Look, let's face it, we Democrats had three flawed candidates running last spring. The one who snagged the nomination, Creigh Deeds, is a likeable guy and a "good man" by all accounts. But put him in a debate, or a post-debate media scrum, or anywhere he has to think quick on his feet and be articulate, and it just doesn't work too well. Also, see my point above about Deeds staying in his comfort zone, with his "home people." That's a fundamental flaw for a statewide candidate in diverse, increasingly urban/suburban/exurban Virginia.
In addition, I must say that all the arguments I heard back in the primary about how whoever won the Democratic primary would have "plenty of money" were completely wrong. The fact is, Deeds got outspent by Bob McDonnell in 2005, and he got outspent by Bob McDonnell in 2009. The more things change...
Speaking of "the more things change," another fallacious argument made in the primary was that Deeds was "most electable" because he had "only" lost to McDonnell by 300+ votes in 2005. Of course, people making that argument ignored one key word: LOST. Given that Creigh lost to Bob McDonnell in 2005, a year in which Democrats were energized against Bush, in which Tim Kaine was beating Jerry Kilgore, and in which Creigh started off as the prohibitive favorite against McDonnell, the fact that he lost that race - by however many votes - should have sent up red flage to Democrats everywhere. But, given the nasty Moran-McAuliffe bloodbath, people pretty much ignored all that. The results are now evident.
Here's what one contributor had to say about Deeds' flaws.
Every campaign I have ever worked on or volunteered on eventually took on the personality of the candidate (good, bad or indifferent). This campaign did exactly that. My personal experience with Deeds is consistent with the strategy (or lack thereof) employed in this campaign. Lack of focus, delayed decision making and general disarray are all characteristics Creigh has shown in his public service through flip flop votes, lackluster policy positions and inability to energize anyone over anything. This campaign represented the candidate accurately, and we'll all pay the price for 4 years.
Finally, the entire concept that a mushy "moderate" is the best candidate for Democrats to run statewide does not appear to have made any headway in this election. Instead, Deeds' discomfort with many core Democratic priorities, from cap and trade to the public option, turned off much of the "base" in what was an inherently low-turnout, "base" election. Not good. Also, as one Virginia Democratic insider said to me, "I think [Deeds] truly doesn't know what he stands for, he just wanted to be governor...well, it is not my responsibility or yours to make HIS dreams come true." Ouch.
3. Tim Kaine
It may be unfair, and at least one contributor to this "after action review" said he "feels sorry for Tim Kaine," but I guess that's how it goes in politics. The fact is, Tim Kaine's governorship accomplished almost none of the goals he set forth when he took office. Fixing transportation? Can we say "abusive driver fees," "unconstitutional regional taxation authorities" and the "transportation monstrosity?" Ugh. Universal pre-k? Nope. Investments in higher education? Nope. Expansion of health care access? Nope. Working across the aisle in Richmond? Nope. "Smart growth"/tying land use planning and transportation more closely? Nope. The fact is, Kaine accomplished basically none of the goals he laid out in his 2005 campaign. True, this can largely be blamed on the Republican-controlled, flat-earther House of Delegates, plus the national economic downturn which adversely affected states (and governors) all over the country. But did Virginia voters yesterday see it that way? Do voters ever see it that way? I doubt it. More likely, they blame the guy at the top, and that's partly what happened this time. Which, again, is why Deeds' fundamental decision to run as a "continuity" candidate in a "change" year was a big mistake.
The fact is, Tim Kaine was able to run four years ago as "Mark Warner Part II" because a) Warner was super-popular; and b) Kaine was his lieutenant. In addition, the memory of Jim Gilmore nearly driving Virginia into the ditch was fresh in people's minds back in 2005. Today, that might as well be ancient history, yet the Deeds campaign tried to run the same playbook as Kaine did in '05 (in addition, Kaine ran against Kilgore in part by tying him to the national Republican Party, specifically to George W. Bush; Deeds couldn't do that with McDonnell this time around). As if all that wasn't bad enough, the Deeds campaign ran as "Tim Kaine Part II" without without Tim Kaine himself actually coming out forcefully and repeatedly saying that Deeds was his heir. Was Deeds trying to thread the needle by trying to be the "legacy" candidate while distancing himself from the current Governo? That certainly would help explain ads that portrayed Deeds with Mark Warner but not with Tim Kaine. If that's the case, it was not a smart decision -- way too nuanced for voters, which is the same as saying way too muddled and unclear a campaign theme. I suspect that this was the case: the Deeds campaign outsmarting itself, being "too clever by half" as the saying goes.
Another point about Tim Kaine's governorship: I'd argue that it was classic DLC "triangulation" strategy, attempting again and again to "reach across the aisle," even after it was crystal clear that would not work with the band of flat-earthers in the House of Delegates. In addition, Kaine made some truly awful decisions that were not forced on him, including signing the estate tax repeal (cost Virginia $120 million a year to help a few super-rich families that didn't need the money), signing the transportation "monstrosity" (most of which was thrown out as politically or legally unacceptable), tying himself so closely to Dominion Power, constantly talking about how Virginia is "business friendly" (that's great, but what about worker or environmental friendly for a change?), etc. At this point, I think it's fair to say that many progressive activists are frustrated with Kaine's governorship and certainly not fired up about the idea of "Tim Kaine Part Deux," whatever that might mean. I mean, if Kaine had thrown progressives even a few bones - anything! - then there could have been some effective targeted marketing to progressives (aka, the backbone of any Democratic campaign's volunteer effort) to get them energized. But nooooo....
One final point on Tim Kaine: from Deeds' perspective, it was probably not helpful that Tim Kaine took the DNC job. For starters, that meant Kaine was really busy, out of the state much of the time, and largely unavailable to campaign for Deeds. I'm not necessarily saying that Kaine made a bad decision to take the DNC job, I'm just saying that it didn't work out well from Deeds' perspective. In addition to taking up a lot of Kaine's time, it also made him problematic for Deeds to use as a surrogate. Why? Because Kaine could be labeled as a "national" figure - which is true - when Deeds desperately wanted to focus on Virginia issues, and because it would make it easier for Virginia Republicans to demonize Kaine as "liberal liberal liberal (blah blah blah)" - a clash with Deeds' determination to appear "moderate" (whatever that means). Of course, if the Deeds campaign had been a bit more adept, perhaps they could have handled this situation. But they weren't, and they didn't. In the end, I'm told that Kaine was "ignored by the Deeds campaign," mainly because they didn't want him "meddling," even though he just won the state four years ago and also helped his friend Barack Obama carry the state. Whatever.
4. Coordinated Campaign/DPVA
As far as the "coordinated" campaign is concerned, three words I've heard frequently the past few months are: what coordinated campaign? As one contributor to this report wrote:
...the Coordinated Campaign was a joke. They didn't get people on the ground until August - McAulliffe's entire operation was there, built and ready for the taking in June and they dumped it. HUGE mistake. Kaine had people on the ground in April. Creigh's people were on the ground so late, they had to narrow their universe to surge/federal Dems instead of base voters. They also refused to "feed" their base with things like yard signs etc. which left people further demoralized. You MUST feed your base. Always. I couldn't get a sign or bumper sticker until late September - we should've had them in July Creigh's weakest precincts in the primary were the big minority precincts - you were right - he didn't do anything at all to get our newest supporters/base voters into this. If you don't feed your base, you lose.
In addition, a Democratic committee chair in a very large county gave me an earful (over the phone) about the "coordinated." According to this individual, who I respect greatly, the coordinated campaign was an "absolute disaster from the git-go," with "nonexistent or at best poor communication," "everything 2-3 months late," and "even more arrogant than the Deeds people if you can imagine that" (note: Kevin O'Holleran was the "Coordinated" Campaign director). In addition, this committee chair told me that the regional field directors were "horrible," that the "coordinated" thought the county chairs were all idiots who didn't know how to win elections, that they completely ignored the people who knew what to do about the absentee ballot program (and, as a result, information wasn't included, letters were wrong, etc.) and "acted like they were doing you a big favor to even talk to you." The "Coordinated" also messed up the sample ballots, "flip-flopping the order of candidates in a very confusing manner." Their GOTV effort was "lackluster at best." On and on it goes. In sum, this committee chair told me that he/she has "never seen anything like this before," that "house candidates are livid, doing everything possible to separate themselves from Deeds," and that "if the coordinated had done even a half decent job, Deeds wouldn't have been down 10-15 points but maybe just 5 points or so."
As far as the DPVA is concerned, it appears to be time for new, dynamic, progressive leadership. Is Chap Petersen interested and/or available? Donald McEachin? Scott Surovell? Peter Rousselot? Just a few ideas I thought I'd throw out there.
P.S. The pathetic concession statements last night by Dickie Cranwell and Matt Mansell, all about how we're going to work in a "bipartisan," "non-partisan and pragmatic" manner with three far-right-wing extremists (McDonnell, Bolling, Cuccinelli), demonstrate exactly what everyone's talking about here. These people are utterly clueless and need to be replaced.
5. Bob McDonnell's Campaign
As hard as it is to admit, Bob McDonnell was an excellent candidate - disciplined, on message, articulate, smooth, polished, excellent "retail" politician, etc. - with a strong message (even if I totally disagree with it) and plenty of money to get that message out there. McDonnell took all that and ran a nearly flawless campaign, crafting his personal and political narrative (he's a "moderate" "soccer dad" from Fairfax, Hampton Roads, wherever you live!) with great skill (unlike the "blue team," unfortunately) and almost never getting thrown off of his game, except with one major slip up - telling Amy Gardner about this Regent University thesis. That was stupid, but McDonnell recovered after taking a beating for a few weeks. In fact, I'd say he more than recovered, as the Deeds campaign focused far too much on the thesis and got thrown off their game plan (if they even had a game plan, which they very well might not have).
In a way, the thesis turned into a trap for the Deeds campaign, almost making me wonder if Bob McDonnell and his campaign were clever enough to have lured Creigh into it. I doubt it, but if they did that, it was freaking brilliant. In addition, McDonnell "nationalized" the race in a way that left Creigh tongue-tied and flabbergasted nearly the entire campaign. As far as his paid media was concerned, that TV ad with his daughter was probably one of the best political ads by a statewide candidate in modern Virginia history. If you asked the average voter on Election Day the first thing that comes to mind when you say the words "Bob McDonnell," I bet they would say the ad with the Iraq War vet daughter. It was brilliant, it personalized and humanized him, it was sweet and made him look compassionate. Something the Deeds campaign never did for its candidate, by the way (once again, I'm overusing this word, but it was absolutely inexcusable - political malpractice, even - not to tell Creigh's personal story). Finally, McDonnell's campaign was quick to capitalize on Creigh's mistakes, including some hilarious YouTube videos (highlighting the disastrous post-debate scrums, mocking the constant use of the silly phrase "everything's on the table," etc.). Impressive.
[Addendum to item #5: A Democratic activist who I respect greatly writes, "Remember that "follow the leader" ad from McDonnell early on? Well done -- defined Deeds as a man without plans early on, and why this didn't light a fire under Deeds, we'll never know."]
6. Organizing for America
This one comes from a Democratic Party insider and has been only slightly edited by me.
There is one factor that you have not yet talked about, but I think deserves mention: the role (or lack of role) of Organizing for America (OFA), its Virginia network, and its email list in the Deeds campaign.Unfortunately, that didn't happen.
Either because of Deeds' own waffling over his relationship to the issues Obama championed in 2008 and is championing in 2009; and/or because of Deeds' failure to understand how fundamentally Virginia's electorate was changed by the Obama campaign; and/or because of Tim Kaine's (with his DNC hat on) failure to work through with the White House and/or Deeds what the role of OFA-VA would be in the Deeds campaign, mixed signals were sent from June through November 3 regarding the role of OFA-VA in the Deeds campaign.
At various times, two conflicting and inconistent answers were provided to me and to others on this subject:
Answer Number One: OFA-VA is going to stick 100% to advancing President Obama's issue agenda in Virginia (for 2009 that means health care), and therefore OFA-VA and its organizers and its email list are not going to play any role in the election for Governor;
Answer Number Two: For part of the time, OFA-VA is going to play a role in the Governor's race, and is going to actively support the election of Creigh Deeds.
If, right from the beginning when he won the nomination, Creigh Deeds and his campaign could have had a coherent strategy about Deeds' relationship with President Obama and the issues he championed last year and this year, and if the DNC and the White House could have complemented Deeds' embrace of Obama and his Virginia supporters with the consistent and systematic mobilization of the OFA-VA network from June through election day, that would have been a very big plus for the Deeds campaign.
Conclusion
This is not a complete "after action review," but it's a start, with many people - elected officals, party officials, candidates, grassroots folks, etc. - providing me inputs. I'm sure there are other factors we've all missed; your thoughts?
UPDATE: Also, I strongly recommend Ben Tribbett's excellent analysis of this race. One key lesson: "pandering to right wingers is not a successful electoral strategy." I would add, "and abandoning the core of what your party stands for..."
