First, he can impose crippling sanctions against Iran. But that is possible only if the Russians cooperate. Moscow has the rolling stock and reserves to supply all of Iran’s fuel needs if it so chooses, and Beijing can also remedy any Iranian fuel shortages. Both Russia and China have said they don’t want sanctions; without them on board, sanctions are meaningless.This is not sounding good to me, as I'm not optimistic we're really going to get Russia to cooperate. If not, then we're faced with two bad choices: 1) a nuclear Iran, severe damage to nuclear non-proliferation efforts, a possible nuclear arms race in the Middle East and/or Iran-Israel war (which would likely suck other countries in); or 2) war with Iran, consisting mainly of airstrikes against Iranian nuclear facilities (at least the ones we know about), plus most likely a broadening of the conflict as Iran mines the Strait of Hormuz, activates Hezbollah in Lebanon, etc. The latter option, of course, could also lead to a major spike in world oil prices, which in turn could plunge us back into a deep recession just as we claw our way out of the last one. Ummmm....can we PLEASE start a crash effort to getting off of oil now?!?
Second, Obama can take military action against Iran, something easier politically and diplomatically for the United States to do itself rather than rely on Israel. By itself, Israel cannot achieve air superiority, suppress air defenses, attack the necessary number of sites and attempt to neutralize Iranian mine-laying and anti-ship capability all along the Persian Gulf. Moreover, if Israel struck on its own and Iran responded by mining the Strait of Hormuz, the United States would be drawn into at least a naval war with Iran — and probably would have to complete the Israeli airstrikes, too.
And third, Obama could choose to do nothing (or engage in sanctions that would be the equivalent of doing nothing). Washington could see future Iranian nuclear weapons as an acceptable risk. But the Israelis don’t, meaning they would likely trigger the second scenario. It is possible that the United States could try to compel Israel not to strike — though it’s not clear whether Israel would comply — something that would leave Obama publicly accepting Iran’s nuclear program.
And this, of course, would jeopardize Obama’s credibility. It is possible for the French or Germans to waffle on this issue; no one is looking to them for leadership. But for Obama simply to acquiesce to Iranian nuclear weapons, especially at this point, would have significant diplomatic and domestic political ramifications. Simply put, Obama would look weak — and that, of course, is why the Iranians announced the second nuclear site. They read Obama as weak, and they want to demonstrate their own resolve. That way, if the Russians were thinking of cooperating with the United States on sanctions, Moscow would be seen as backing the weak player against the strong one. The third option, doing nothing, therefore actually represents a significant action.
[...]
...If Obama accepts Iranian nukes without serious sanctions or military actions, the American position in the Islamic world will decline dramatically. The Arab states in the region rely on the United States to protect them from Iran, so U.S. acquiescence in the face of Iranian nuclear weapons would reshape U.S. relations in the region far more than a hundred Cairo speeches.
Stratfor: Obama's Three Choices on Iran
Monday, September 28, 2009
The following analysis on the Iran situation (and the Obama administration's strategic choices) is courtesy of Stratfor (subscription required, but "this report may be forwarded or republished on your website with attribution"). I thought it was interesting, so I'm passing along an excerpt.